Degrowth as a solution to the energy problem by Karagkiozi, Despoina
i 
 
 
 
Degrowth as a solution to 
the energy problem 
 
Despoina Karagkiozi 
 
 
SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS, BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION & LEGAL STUDIES 
A thesis submitted for the degree of  
Master of Science (MSc) in Energy Law, Business, Regulation and Policy  
 
 
 
 
January 2019 
Thessaloniki – Greece 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ii 
 
Student Name:  Despoina Karagkiozi 
SID:  1108150008 
Supervisor: Prof. Enzo Di Giulio 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I hereby declare that the work submitted is mine and that where I have made use of 
another’s work, I have attributed the source(s) according to the Regulations set in the 
Student’s Handbook. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
January 2019 
Thessaloniki - Greece 
 
iii 
 
Abstract 
This dissertation refers to the proposal of sustainable Degrowth as an alternative 
solution to energy resource depletion and climate change. World’s energy demand 
relates closely to growth and the raise of GDP. If nothing changes climate change and 
energy resource depletion will be fatal for human mankind and the earth. The use of 
renewables is limited to electricity, unable to mitigate global warming to sustainable 
levels, not to mention the deadly consequences of a nuclear accident. Energy 
efficiency has not lead to the necessary energy use fall, neither is expected to. 
The degrowth proposal sets under question growth as the basis of society and calls the 
world to pay attention to more than this such as ethical values, wellbeing, democracy, 
environmental limits. Born from several philosophical horizons, movements and 
intellectual resources, sustainable degrowth is a multifaced project that does not refer 
merely to the decrease of the economy, such as similar alternative proposals (e.g. a-
growth, stready state economy), but aims to change the system that lies underneath in 
order to achieve a “right-sizing” of the economy. However the implementation of it in 
the growth-based society we are into is a tough call that could take place only as a last 
resort in case of radical and unexpected sociopolitical changes. 
 
Keywords: degrowth, climate change, energy resource depletion, a-growth, steady-
state economy 
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CHAPTER 1: ENERGY TODAY 
1.1. Energy Use Perspective 
It is a common acknowledged fact that there is no simple answer referring to the 
world’s energy perspective since the decisions and the policies to be applied in the 
future are hard to tell today. This is why the World Energy Outlook 2018 models and 
presents three case scenarios according to the assumed future energy policies: the 
New Policies Scenario, the Current Policies Scenario and the Sustainable Development 
Scenario (IEA, 2018a).  
The New Policies Scenario takes into account the present policies, measures and policy 
proposals by mid-2018, incorporating the Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) 
pledged under the Paris Agreement. 
The Current Policies Scenario embodies the policies and measures that are 
currently enacted or adopted by mid-2018, offering a baseline picture of the energy 
sector without any further policy intervention. Thus it does not take into account any 
policy actions that may be possible in the future but does embody technological 
improvements. Fossil fuels are expected to be of higher demand and consequently of 
higher prices but not to the point to allow RES to widespread. Subsequently CO2 
emissions are expected to rise. 
The Sustainable Development Scenario is based on three goals of the UN 2030 Agenda 
for Sustainable Development: universal access to modern energy services (SDG 7), 
action to tackle climate change according to the objectives of the Paris Agreement 
(SDG 13) and the reduction of health impacts of air pollution by posing a limitation on 
other energy-related pollutants (SDG 3.9). The energy demand is expected to be lower 
which means that there is less need for fossil fuels pushing their prices down, including 
oil prices (Table 1).  
 
Table 1: Fossil-fuel import prices by scenario (IEA, 2018c).  
 
Notes: MBtu = million British thermal units. The IEA crude oil price is a weighted average import price among IEA member 
countries. Natural gas prices are weighted averages expressed on a gross calorific-value basis. The US gas price reflects the 
wholesale price prevailing on the domestic market. The EU and China gas prices reflect a balance of pipeline and liquefied natural 
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gas (LNG) imports, while the Japan gas price is solely LNG imports; the LNG prices used are those at the customs border, prior to 
regasification. Steam coal prices are weighted averages adjusted to 6 000 kilocalories per kilogramme. The US steam coal price 
reflects mine-mouth prices (primarily in the Powder River Basin, Illinois Basin, Northern Appalachia and Central Appalachia 
markets) plus transport and handling cost. Coastal China steam coal price reflects a balance of imports and domestic sales, while 
the EU and Japanese steam coal price is solely for imports. 
 
CO2 is expected to be taxed in all OECD countries resulting in a CO2 price 
convergence from 2025 reaching 140$/tonne CO2 in most OECD countries by 2040. In 
addition, several non-OECD countries are expected to limit CO2 emissions using cap-
and-trade schemes. Last but not least since all regional markets have alternatives for 
energy, a convergence of prices is expected to take place (Table 2).  
 
 
Table 2: CO2 price in selected regions by scenario ($2017 per tonne) (IEA, 2018c). 
 
*In Canada's benchmark/backstop policies, a carbon price is applied to fuel consumed in additional sectors.  
**Coverage of aviation is limited to the same regions as in the New Policies Scenario. 
Apart from the above scenarios the Future is Electric Scenario was developed 
specifically for the WEO-2018 with a focus on electrification, starting from the 
conditions of the New Policies Scenario and presupposing that electric technologies 
are affordable and widely adopted without any constraints by infrastructure, supply 
chains or consumer preference. It is expected that by 2040 electricity will rise at least 
to an extraordinary 31% of final consumption (Figure 1). However the extent of its use 
depends on the policy to be applied in the future and the technological improvements. 
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Figure 1: Electricity demand by scenario and share of electricity in total final consumption. 
This is mainly attributed to the expected wide use of electric cars and the 
adoption of heat pumps in buildings and low-temperature heat in industry (IEA, 2018b). 
The above are illustrated in Table 3.  
Table 3: Definitions and objectives of the WEO-2018 scenarios (IEA, 2018b). 
 
According to Figure 2 and the New and Current Policies 2018 scenarios of IEA, the 
energy related CO2 emissions are expected to rise in high correlation with the energy 
demand’s increase by over ¼ till 2040, whereas the Sustainable Development scenario 
shows a considerable decrease of CO2 emissions till 2040 although the demand 
remains stable mainly by improving energy efficiency which is considered as the least 
costly abatement option (IEA, 2018a). 
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Notes: Bubble size and numbers represent total primary energy demand. Mtoe = Million tonnes of oil equivalent; 
Gtoe = gigatons of oil equivalent or 1000 Gtoe; Gt CO2= gigatones CO2. 
Figure 2: World primary energy demand and energy-related CO2 emissions by scenario (IEA, 
2018a).  
 
Figure 3 shows schematically that not even the Future is Electric 2018 scenario is 
sufficient to hold back the increase of CO2 emissions in the future, but only the 
Sustainable Development Scenario manages to meet climate goals keeping CO2 
emissions’ rise well below 2°C, between a 1.7 1.8°C (Figure 4). Today the world is 
already around 1 °C warmer than in pre-industrial times. The increase of energy-
related CO2 emissions in the New Policies Scenario, along with emissions of other 
GHGs, would cause a temperature rise of around 2.7°C by 2100 (IEA, 2018a). 
 Note: Gt=gigatons; TFC= total final consumption; Other= power generation and other transformation; FIES=Future 
is Electric Scenario; SDS= Sustainable Development Scenario. 
Figure 3: World energy-related CO2 emissions by scenario (left) and change in CO2 emissions by 
sector in 2040 relative to the New Policies Scenario (IEA, 2018a). 
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Notes: Figure shows energy-related CO2 emissions, including CO2 emissions from industrial processes. Scenarios 
projecting a median temperature rise in 2100 of around 1.7-1.8 °C above pre-industrial levels are those following 
Representative Concentration Pathway (RCP) 2.6 in the Shared Socioeconomic Pathways database. See 
https://tntcat.iiasa.ac.at/SspDb/. 
Figure 4: CO2 emissions in the Sustainable Development Scenario and other “well below 2°C 
(1.7-1.8°C) (IEA, 2018a). 
 
Population and world gross domestic product (GDP) are also considered among 
the fundamental factors to estimate the energy use perspective, although the 
relationship is not linear. In WEO-2018 the rates of population growth are based on 
the projections of the United Nations Population Division report (UNPD, 2014). World 
population is expected to grow from 7.5 billion in 2017 to 9.2 billion in 2040, having a 
reduced growth rate as years pass by: from 1.2% per year in 2000-2017 to 1.0% in 
2017-2025 and 0.9% in 2017-2040 (Table 4).  
Table 4: Population assumption by region (IEA, 2018b). 
 
 - 6  -  
 
The population of the developed countries already accounts for 20% of global 
population and is hardly growing any longer, while in developing countries the 
population growth rates are considerably higher. 
To the same direction, world gross domestic product (GDP) is expected to grow 
on average by 3.4% per year from 2017 to 2040 (Table 5).  
 
Table 5: Real GDP growth assumptions by region (IEA, 2018c). 
 
However annual average growth is expected to fall from 3.7% during 2017-2025 
to 3.3% during 2025-2040. India ‘s GDP is expected to grow faster than any other 
region’s, followed by China ‘s and Southeast Asia’s, with Europe and Japan coming last 
in the line. 
Last but not least since excise taxes, value added tax rates and subsidies are also 
of great importance for the formation of the fuel prices and they should be taken into 
account. In WEM2018 however they are expected to face no change over the 
projection period till 2040. 
 
1.2. World’s energy needs 
The world’s energy needs are constantly getting higher as Figure 5 clearly shows, 
and are expected to continue this way according to the New Policies Scenario with the 
only exception of North America, whereas the Sustainable Development Scenario 
shows a slight decrease in energy demand worldwide attributed to efficiency 
improvements (Figure 6). 
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Notes: Calculated on the basis of GDP in year-2012 dollars expressed in real purchasing power parity terms. 
TPED = total primary energy demand. 
Figure 5: Primary energy demand and GDP (IEA, 2013). 
 
 
Notes: NPS= New Policies Scenario; SDS= Sustainable Development Scenario. Total primary energy demand 
excludes traditional use of biomass. 
 
Figure 6: Total primary energy demand and CO2 emissions per capita by selected region and 
scenario (IEA, 2018a). 
 
The increase in worldwide energy demand is currently concentrated in Asia, 
having China and India to represent over 40% of the total energy demand growth. A 
significant growth also takes place in Southeast Asia (8% of global energy demand 
growth) and Africa (6%) no matter their low per capita energy use. According to the 
International Energy Agency (IEA), the actual increase in global demand for electricity 
has been significantly higher than the projections of primary energy consumption. This 
is a clear indication of the increasing importance of electricity for energy supply and 
end-use applications. As a matter of fact the energy demand is heavily influenced by 
factors such as the economic activity, climatic conditions, and decisions of individual 
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governments and is different for each sector of economic activity (commercial, 
industrial, residential and transportations sector) (Shaik and Yeboah, 2018).   
According to the Global Energy and CO2 Status Report (IEA, 2017a), “Global 
energy demand rose by 2.1% in 2017, more than twice the previous year’s rate, 
boosted by strong global economic growth, with oil, gas and coal meeting most of the 
increase in demand for energy, and renewables seeing impressive gains”. If there are 
no big changes to the current growth policy, energy demand is forecasted to grow in a 
non-linear and at a greater speed in the future. According to IEA’s 2018 New Policies 
Scenario, global energy demand will grow from almost 14Mtoe in 2017 to almost 
18Mtoe in 2040. Specifically, the demand will be 28% for oil, 22% for coal, 25% for 
natural gas, 5% for nuclear and 20% for renewables ( 
Figure 7).  
 
 
Note: NPS=New Policies Scenario; FIES= Future is Electric Scenario; SDS= Sustainable Development Scenario. 
 
Figure 7: Shares of fuels in world primary energy demand today and in 2040 by scenario (IEA, 
2018a). 
1.3. Environmental aspects  
According to UNEP’s 2018 Emissions Gap Report global GHG emissions have reached 
historical levels (53.5 Gigatons in 2017, an increase of 0.7 compared with 2016). It 
notes however that at the same time most countries are reluctant to go into serious 
measures and unprecedented changes in order to keep world temperature increase 
below 1.5°C reducing the risk for people and the earth (UNEP, 2018).  As a matter of 
fact the energy sector produces over 60% of greenhouse-gas emissions. The more 
recent 2018 WMO Greenhouse Gas Bulletin reports that global man-made emissions 
(carbon dioxide, methane and nitrous oxide) are increasing at a steady pace over the 
last years, with CO2 accounting for about 82% of the total radioactive forcing increase 
over the last decade (WMO, 2018). The Report of IPCC in 2018 over Global Warming of 
1.5oC reports that global net emissions of CO2 would need to be reduced to half by 
2030 compared to 2010 levels, and reach "net zero" by 2050, since the change in 
global temperature since the mid-20th century is mainly due to human activity. 
Otherwise there would be a need for techniques to reduce the emissions to the 
desired levels, something that is questionable whether is applicable or not since “the 
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effectiveness of such techniques are unproven at a large scale and some may carry 
significant risks for sustainable development” (IPCC, 2018). 
Energy-related GHG emissions today are about 40 Gt, out of which 75% come from 
industrial processes. However the power sector is expected to drop by 76% by 2040 
according to the Sustainable Development Scenario (IEA, 2018a). 
Notes
 
Notes: Includes CO2, methane and nitrous oxide emissions from fuel combustion and CO2 emissions from industrial 
processes. ICE= internal combustion engine. Other includes renergy-related emissions from other sectors. 100-year 
global warming potential of fossil methane=30, nitrous oxide=265. 
Figure 8: GHG emissions from selected sectors, 2017 and in the Sustainable Development 
Scenario, 2040 (IEA, 2018a). 
The climate change, which we already experience facing global warming, rising 
sea levels, and dangers of extreme weather (heavy rains, storms, floads, heat waves, 
droughts), has concerned the scientists at least for the last 50 years as illustrated in the 
Report for the club of Rome’s project on the predicament of mankind (Meadows et al., 
1972). Still nowadays it remains the most serious issue that shows the way towards 
new policies not only cleaner and technologically more advanced but also new and 
alternative. 2015 in Paris the Parties to the UNFCCC realising the dangers behind 
climate change made for the first time an ethical commitment to reduce climate-
damaging emissions in order to keep the world temperature increase well below 2C 
above pre-industrial levels and to pursue limiting the temperature rise even further to 
1.5 degrees Celsius. The UNFCCCs that followed, with the last in Poland 2018, try to 
promote concrete steps towards this direction. However the USA under President 
Trump’s government have already announced they will withdraw from Paris 
Agreement. So the future seems unpredictable concerning the degree of measures 
that will be taken from the countries in order to achieve the goal of 2C, although 
earth's climate is changing at a great speed (Kontgis et al., 2019), bearing a significant 
threat to humans, animals, and the environment (Thomas et al., 2004; Wheeler and 
Von Braun, 2013). For example, the frequency and intensity of extreme heat is 
expected to rise (Luber and McGeehin, 2008), which may damage worldwide food 
systems (Battisti and Naylor, 2009). The characteristic phrase of ecologist Bill 
McKibben describes the environmental problem in relation to the energy resource 
 - 10  -  
 
depletion clearly and vividly: “Even before we run out of oil, we’re running out of 
planet” (McKibben, 2007). 
Scientists working in the anthropogenic climate science describe climate change 
as the biggest threat for public health this century (Goodman, 2013; 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2007a, 2007b, 2007c, 2007d; Watts et al., 
2015; Whitmee et al., 2015). 2017 was one of the warmest years ever recorded 
characterized by warmer-than-average temperature on land and ocean surfaces 
worldwide. Since global records began in 1880, a record warmth was observed in 2017 
across nearly all continents, not to mention the oceans which had their third warmest 
year (Climate Monitoring). Climate change made the air quality worse, the weather 
conditions dangerous and placed not only physical but also mental health at stake 
(Epstein, 2005).  
  
1.4. Natural Resources Depletion-Hubbert’s peak 
WEO-2008 and WEO-2013 presented an analyses of decline rates in oil fields 
based on actual production data for a quite large number of fields. The decline rates 
vary according to the type of field, the geographical location and the decline phase. 
There is also a difference in decline rates between observed decline rates and natural 
decline rates (the decline rate that would be observed in the absence of further 
investment in producing fields).  
The estimated volume of reserves has doubled since estimations of 1980 mainly 
because of revisions made in the 1980s in OPEC countries and less because of new 
discoveries. Thus since 1990 there have been noted modest increases in oil reserves, 
although oil consumption is rising.  
Middle East and the traditional players of OPEC are currently under pressure 
since the discovered oil fields, accounted for about 80% of the world’s oil reserves, are 
getting old and quite expensive whereas the United States tight oil output, Canada’s oil 
sands and Brazil’s deep-water production is rising at a fast pace. Not to mention the 
natural gas which is discovered all over the world. However by mid-2020s, non-OPEC 
production is expected to decrease with OPEC providing once more most of the oil 
supply.  
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Figure 9: Declines in current oil production and demand in the New Policies and Sustainable 
Development scenarios (IEA, 2018a). 
At current rates of consumption conventional crude output from existing fields is 
estimated by IEA in WEO 2008 to fall by more than 40mb/d by 2035 facing an annual 
decline of 6%. So more than half of the oil demand projected for 2035 will be needed 
in order to offset the declining production mainly by expensive upstream oil 
investments. As Figure 9 clearly shows, the observed and natural declines of oil 
production till 2025 are much faster than the drop in the Sustainable Development 
Scenario, not to mention the New policies scenario, where the drop is even faster. 
According to 2012 estimations of IEA oil and natural gas reserves are only half of 
a century away from depletion and coal more but just 1,5 times further. Investments 
and new technology may however longer this period, since the total remaining 
recoverable resources are quite more, but still a depletion deadline is estimated to 
occur in the future sooner or later because of fossil fuels non-renewable -fast enough-
nature. As for the most critical energy source, oil, IEA estimates that over 80% of the 
proven reserves are already under production, reducing its volume to be used in the 
future (Figure 10).   
Apart from IEA’s estimations, according to David Rutledge  90% of the global coal 
production will take place till 2070 (Rutledge, 2011). Steve Mohr's national Hubbert 
Linearization estimated 2081 as the key year (Mohr, 2010). Last but not least Patzek 
and Croft's multi-Hubbert cycle analysis gave 2058 (Patzek and Croft, 2010). 
 
Notes: All bubbles are expressed as a number of years of production based on estimated production in 2013. The 
size of the bubble for total remaining recoverable resources of coal is illustrative and is not proportional to the 
others. The figure specifies the status of reserves for coal as of end-2011, and gas and oil as of end- 2012.  
Sources: BGR (2012); O&GJ (2012); USGS (2000, 2012a and 2012b); IEA estimates and analysis. 
Figure 10: Fossil energy resources by type (IEA, 2013). 
The direction of the data in the above Figure 10 towards a fossil energy resource 
depletion deadline reconfirms Hubbert's peak, which is a model that approaches the 
production rate of a non-renewable fossil energy resource over a certain time period. 
Predicting beyond the mere fact of the resource depletion to the actual depletion time 
period, Hubbert’s curve shows the maximum production point at a period when the 
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demand keeps rising, predicting a sharp production fall right afterwards with probable 
dramatic differences in production and demand since the demand continues to 
increase but the production drops. Although Hubbert’s predicted model may be 
applied to many non-renewable energy resources, it was initially scheduled for the US 
oil production (Figure 11). His reasoning lies in the conclusion that when the 
consumption rate of an exhaustible energy resource is greater than its renewal rate 
this leads to a severe resources’ drop right after a production ‘s peak.  
As we can see from the above figure, Hubbert proved to be right up to the 2000’s, 
as US production peaked indeed as predicted in 1970 facing a dramatic decline after 
this point. However Hubbert could not take into account the technological 
advancements of the 21st century, that enabled non-conventional oil to be produced 
and led to a nowadays second peak. 
 
Figure 11: U.S. Crude Oil Production Vs. Hubber Curve. 
However according to the peak oil theory there will be an ultimate peak in oil 
production when there will remain only half of the oil reserves. So it seems that there 
is a large number of external factors that may change Hubbert’s model, slightly or 
more, proving that real production rates are not as simple as a bell shaped curved. 
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1.5. Renewables are not enough; The Danger of Nuclear 
A. According to REN21 Renewables 2018 Global Status Report (GSR) and BP 
Statistical Review of World Energy 2018 renewables grow stronger as years go by, 
being more affordable and enjoying more subsidies than they used to  (BP Statistical 
Review of World Energy, 2018; REN21, 2018) (Figure 12) .  
 
 
World primary energy consumption grew by 2.2% in 2017, up from 1.2% in 2016 and the highest since 2013. Growth was below 
average in Asia Pacific, the Middle East and S. & Cent. America but above average in other regions. All fuels except coal and 
hydroelectricity grew at above-average rates. Natural gas provided the largest increment to energy consumption at 83 million 
tonnes of oil equivalent (mtoe), followed by renewable power (69 mtoe) and oil (65 mtoe). 
Figure 12:  World primary energy consumption in 2017  (BP Statistical Review of World Energy, 
2018). 
 
In IEA’s Renewables 2018 renewables is expected to raise its share in global 
energy demand by 12.4% from 2017 to 2023. However the bigger change upwards will 
be seen in electricity rather than heat and transport, where the increase of renewables 
will be minimal, far less than the era demands (Figure 13).  
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Figure 13: Shares of renewables in electricity, heat and transport 2017 and 2023 (IEA, 2018c). 
 
According to the IEA’s World Energy Outlook 2017 (“Sustainable Development 
Scenario”), the total share of renewables is not enough to keep global temperature 
rise well below 2°C and it is not expected either to be enough in the future, although 
its growth is beyond doubt (IEA, 2017b). This is mainly because of the low use of 
renewable energy in the heat and transport sector where the countries still allow 
global warming-related fossil fuels to prevail enjoying higher production and 
consumption subsidies. As a matter of fact investments in fossil fuel and nuclear 
energy remained high in 2017, (USD 103 billion and USD 42 billion respectively) and 
global coal consumption increased by 1% (REN21, 2018). 
Furthermore, the situation gets even more difficult because of the stochastic 
nature of the output of variable renewables such as wind and solar PV, which allows 
only to a proportion of the installed capacity to be produced. Thus, it is uncertain if the 
SDG 7 will be fulfilled by 2030. 
B. According to the “Health effects due to radiation from the Chernobyl accident 
report”, 2008, UNSCEAR, and the “Sources, effects and Risks of ionizing Radiation 
Report”, 2013, UNSCEAR, nuclear power‘s health impacts in case of an accident are 
severe and deadly depending on the exposure, including deterministic and stochastic 
effects ( immediate death, cancer of several types etc). Moreover there are high risks 
for the non-human biota at land and sea. 
However nowadays there is an acceptance of nuclear energy in some part of the 
academic and scientific society which claim that nuclear energy, in contrary to fossil 
fuels, is capable to support the Sustainable Development Goals of the UN including 
climate change and global warming mitigation (IAEA, 2017). Although they can not 
deny the fatal nature of nuclear energy in case of an accident, they underline the fact 
that on one hand there is no totally harmless energy form, including renewables which 
function is based on fossil material, and on the other hand that, compared to pollution 
from fossil fuel energy, nuclear energy is more friendly and safe. According to 
Kharecha and Hansen, global nuclear power has prevented over one and a half million 
deaths related to air pollution and 64 gigatonnes of CO2-equivalent (GtCO2-eq) GHG 
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emissions that would have resulted from fossil fuel burning (Kharecha and Hansen, 
2013).  
Nevertheless, even if the above allegations are true and nuclear power 
compared to fossil fuel power is indeed safer, this does not mean according to the 
historical data that it is safe in general terms or safer than any other solution of energy 
form or alternative proposal related to the energy and the mitigation of climate 
change.  
 
1.6. The root of the devil in energy economics terms and the way to cut it off 
Living in a growth-based society where consumerism, capitalism and wealth is 
considered as the ultimate good towards a well-promising future, energy is a sine qua 
non factor that contributes to the direction of the economy (Alexander, 2011). When 
the energy gets more and more expensive, as it recently has, and the supply does not 
meet the demand, the economy (firms, households, nations) begins to disfunction 
having several problems such as forced economic degrowth, stagnation, recessions, 
debt default, social turbulence etc. (Tverberg, 2012). The most recent paradigmatic 
example is the global financial crisis of 2008, which still has not thoroughly ended. 
Among others Rubin and Hamilton consider that it was imposed by high oil prices, 
since oil is the mainly used energy source that till recently was affordable enough to 
support the growth of the economy (Hamilton, 2010; Rubin, 2012, 2009). According to 
the last one the 10 out of 11 recessions of the USA after the second world war were 
due to high oil prices. Figure 14 shows schematically the close relationship between oil 
supply and economy. According to Ayers and Warr, 2010, the relationship is not 
bilateral but it’s the energy growth that drives economic growth, and not the reverse 
(Warr and Ayres, 2010). 
 
 
Figure 14: World Oil Supply Growth vs. Growth in World GDP, based on exponential trend lines 
fitted to values for selected groups of years. World GDP based on USDA Economic Research 
Data (Tverberg, 2012).  
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The above described high correlation between economic growth and energy 
supply combined with the growth model, the exceeding earth’s carrying capacity and 
the subsequent serious environmental impact caused by humans seems to be the main 
reasons of the energy resources depletion (Ayers and Warr, 2009; Stern and Kander, 
2011; Warr and Ayres, 2010) that leads the world nowadays to a dead-end seeking for 
the light in the tunnel of non-sustainable -as it seems so- growth.  
Scientists and academics around the globe are now placing energy at the center 
of macro-economic models which imply that we are into a twilight age of economic 
growth (Georgescu‐Roegen, 1971; Murphy & Hall, 2011a, 2011b; Rubin, 2012; D. Stern 
& Kander, 2011; Tverberg, 2012a; Tverberg, 2012b). The era’s turbulence is easy to 
realize after all considering the multitude of energy proposals that aim to a sustainable 
future, not to mention the efforts for higher energy efficiency, alternative sources of 
energy and for electrification.  Starting from the proposal of sustainable development, 
which has not anymore, the glory of the past, to green growth, smart growth, inclusive 
growth etc., it is impressing that all these proposals include the term “growth” in their 
definition. However, there have been efforts for implementation within a growth-
based society in order to make it sustainable, cleaner, greener, smarter, there has not 
been any progress since their introduction to the scientific community. So it seems 
that a non-growing economy is the worst scenario for an economist, but at the same 
time so is for an ecologist an economy that is constantly growing. The above described 
dilemma of growth is what makes this puzzle so difficult to solve for governments and 
institutions (Jackson, 2009). 
According to the above mentioned already, it seems rather impossible to apply a 
carbon-free policy in a society that is motivated according to the imperatives of 
growth, since the cleaner sources of energy (renewables, nuclear) can not keep the 
economy at a growth pace and what’s more phase out fossil fuels with safety. Thus, 
being ready to allow for or accept a growth reduction, in one way or another, is an 
option to seriously think about if sustainability is actually a goal to be achieved for the 
world’s sake in the future. 
In the chapters to follow, the movement of sustainable degrowth in analyzed, 
being compared with a-growth and steady state economy, which are all considered as 
rather alternative if not radical proposals that can be implemented only out of the 
growth model of society that dominates the world today. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 - 17  -  
 
CHAPTER 2:  A LITERATURE REVIEW OF DEGROWTH 
2.1. Historical retrospective of Sustainable Degrowth movement and its important 
exponents 
The term “degrowth” originates from the French word “décroissance”, which the 
French intellectual André Gorz, inspired by Nickolas Georgescu-Roegen, first used 
while criticizing over the first report of the Club of Rome in 1972 about Limits to 
Growth and more specifically over the compatibility of zero growth/degrowth with 
capitalism. Georgescu-Roegen advocated that the endless growth preached by the 
neoliberal economics would only cause irreversible damage because it ignored the 
basic principle of entropy, according to which the energy used cannot return to its 
former state but it is used degraded or transformed in another form. Referring to the 
earth’s natural resources, he advocated that eventually they will be depleted if 
continued to be used in the same way (Georgescu-Roegen, 1973).  
Some other precursors of the idea of degrowth are to name a few, except for 
Georgescu-Roegen, Arendt, Illich and Schumacher (Arendt, 1958; Georgescu-Roegen, 
1973; Illich, 1973; Schumacher, 1973). The exponents of degrowth come from several 
philosophical horizons, movements and intellectual sources (Bayon et al., 2010; 
Ridoux, 2006). One group comes from anthropologists who criticise the idea that the 
growth-based northern  countries are to be imitated by the countries of the south 
(Cochet, 2005; Hoogendijk, 1991; Hueting, 1980a; Latouche, 2006; Ridoux, 2006). 
Serge Latouche is one of the leading personalities of this school of thoughts. Karl 
Polanyi describes this as an “irruption of the generalized market system” (Polanyi, 
1944). Another group focuses on democracy as the basis for the economic and social 
system (Arie`s, 2007; Ellul, 1983; Fotopoulos, 1997; Gorz, 2008; Gras, 2007; Illich, 1973; 
Polanyi, 1944; Schneider et al., 2001). Another source of degrowth comes from the 
ecology (Alexander, 2009; Besson-Girard, 2005; Guattari, 1989; Mongeau, 1985; Odum 
and Odum, 2001; Rabhi, 1983; Schneider et al., 2001; Thoreau, 1854). The last group 
comes from bio-economics or else ecological economics, believing in more equity and 
dealing with resource depletion and waste disposal (Hueting, 1980b). The theory of 
degrowth started at the time of the oil crisis in the 70s and the economic recession 
that followed, but was then abandoned after the crisis was over. It reappeared to the 
global energy scenery beginning from France, and later Italy and Spain in the late 90s-
early 2000s as a criticism to sustainable development. However the term of ‘degrowth’ 
was first used 2008 at the Paris first international conference of Schneider’s Research 
and Degrowth, expanding worldwide afterwards entering to important academic 
journals and at least 7 special issues in peer-reviewed journals (Cattaneo et al., 2012; 
Kallis et al., 2012; Saed, 2012; Schneider et al., 2010; Sekulova et al., 2013; Whitehead, 
2013). 
 
2.2. Defining Degrowth 
Concerning the definition of “Degrowth” the First International Conference on Socially 
Sustainable Economic Degrowth for Ecological Sustainability and Social Equity held in 
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Paris in 2008 underlines in its Declaration that degrowth is a "voluntary transition 
towards a just, participatory, and ecologically sustainable society”. Degrowth aims to 
“meet basic human needs and to ensure a high quality of life, while reducing the 
ecological impact of the global economy to a sustainable level, equitably distributed 
between nations” by transforming the global economic system and the governments’ 
policies in order to eradicate absolute poverty achieving a “right-sizing” of both national 
and global economy. According to Schneider et al. degrowth is "an equitable 
downscaling of production and consumption that increases human well- being and 
enhances ecological conditions at the local and global level, in the short and long term", 
suggesting sustainability in both environmental and social terms (Schneider et al., 
2010). Kallis sees degrowth as a "multi-facet political project that aspires to mobilize 
support for a change of direction, at the macrolevel of economic and political 
institutions and at the micro level of personal values and aspirations" and defines it 
from an ecological economics point of view as "a socially sustainable and equitable 
reduction (and eventually stabilization) of society's throughput" (Kallis, 2011). 
According to him the goal is the reduction of income and material comfort not to be 
experienced as welfare loss. He considers degrowth as an "umbrella keyword" that links 
government’s policy with social movements. Degrowth puzzles the scientific community 
that deals with the limits of economic growth and searches for alternative paths to 
prosperity (Kallis, 2011; Martínez-Alier et al., 2010; Schneider et al., 2010; Spangenberg, 
2010). Martinez-Alier et al., claims that degrowth challenges the society to become 
better through a “post-development” way that’s characterized by justice and ecological 
limits (Martínez-Alier et al., 2010). Thus from a political point of view degrowth is all 
about democracy, equality, justice, and self-determination aiming to a directly 
democratic society with better structures than today (Fournier, 2008; Latouche, 2010). 
Latouche considers that the goal of growth should be abandoned for the sake of growth 
itself (Latouche, 2009). 
To end with, degrowth is not a negative size of growth. It does not call for doing 
less, but for doing things in a different way that reassures well-being and prosperity 
that is irrelevant from GDP. It aims to train people to think beyond money as a life’s 
goal and act in harmony with each other and the environment. As Latouche puts it, 
degrowth aims to be associated with “Better”, not “Less”. (Latouche, 2009). 
 
 2.3. Degrowth Proposals 
Degrowth proposals focus either on institutional and policy reforms (Fournier, 2008) or 
to some radical ideas that are difficult to apply in today’s world as we’ve used to it. As 
for the first category, emphasis is given to redistribution (of work and free time, 
natural resources and wealth), social security and gradual relocalisation of the 
economy in order to reduce the size of it according to degrowth’s beliefs. Filka 
Sekulova proposes the reduction of the intermediaries, the decrease of the number of 
appliances and goods used or consumed per household and the introduction of 
simpler technologies along with strict regulation of advertising, work sharing and slow-
mode transportation (Sekulova et al., 2013). Gorz and Victor propose a reduction of 
the working hours (Gorz, 1994; Victor, 2010), while Raventos insists on a basic income 
that ensures economic security to everyone (Raventós, 2007). Jackson believes in a 
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labour policy for less productivity and more employment in humane sectors such as 
health or education (Jackson, 2009), to the same direction with Latouche who 
proposes salary caps (Latouche, 2009). Distributive taxes may finance public 
investments such as gardens, squares etc. according to La touche (Latouche, 2009). 
Relocalisation may be based on complementary local currencies according to Seyfang 
(Seyfang, 2001) and on the decentralization of the Banks (Korten, 2008) . Taxes to 
polluting uses and resources, as well as to nuclear energy) are also proposed along 
withCO2 caps (Alcott, 2010; Kallis and Martinez-Alier, 2010). Shared mobility and 
cohousing have also been proposed in the degrowth literature as a way to avoid 
resource use and unnecessary material flows on the one hand and to bring people 
closer on the other hand (Schneider et al., 2010).  
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CHAPTER 3:  DIFFERENCE BETWEEN SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 
AND DEGROWTH 
According to the Brundtland Commission definition “Sustainable development is 
development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of 
future generations to meet their own needs” (WCED, 1987).  
Although more than 30 years have passed since the report of the WCED, politics 
and public attitudes have not changed enough to avoid climate change and 
biodiversity loss. Theodoropoulos considers that the experience of the last 20 years 
has shown that sustainable development cannot be ecologically viable, since it still 
exhausts natural resources and has not improved prosperity and quality of life 
(Theodoropoulos, 2013). According to Georgescu-Roegen, sustainable development has 
been “a lovely lullaby” that’s been putting the world to a long sleep with dreams of a 
bright future of wealth combined with prosperity which can not be put into practice 
(Georgescu-Roegen, 1993). It was first launched 1992 at the Rio Conference and 
dominated the energy scenery afterwards throughout the last decade of the 20th century 
despite, or maybe because of, its non-specific meaning. However it seems that the first 
enthusiasm over it has long ceased to exist. The words of Professor W. Adams from IUCN 
2006 are characteristic setting under question the role of Sustainable Development 
nowadays: “In implying everything, sustainable development arguably ends up meaning 
nothing" just like it happened with previous movements such as the social development, 
the human development, etc. 
The diagram below (Figure 15) shows schematically in quite simple terms the 
main differences between sustainable development and degrowth which result to the 
different approach and key-solutions each proposal has towards the current 
environmental problems. Sustainable development requires a decoupling of GDP 
(growth) and use of energy resources with the help of technology and efficiency 
improvements to the point that GDP increases while the use of resources stays stable 
or even decreases. Meanwhile it presupposes a standard demographic transition all 
over the world that leads to a stabilised world population. In contrary, according to the 
degrowth proposal, the use of resources, along with the world’s population, are not 
expected to grow but rather to decrease after a short period of booming accompanied 
by GDP factor in the same direction and proportional size. Degrowth rejects growth 
aiming to a “post-development” way that’s characterized by justice and ecological 
limits (Martínez-Alier et al., 2010). According to D’ Alisa et al. sustainable degrowth 
underlines that the environmental impact may be reduced by a democratic way of 
living that shrinks production and consumption (D’Alisa et al., 2015) “re-centring the 
society around care” in order for justice and well-being to prevail against GDP growth 
(D’Alisa et al., 2015). 
The only part that’s the same between these two theories is the message of 
environmentalism that warns mankind for almost half century now as an alarm 
(Boulding and Boulding, 1995) that energy resources will sooner or later be depleted 
due to their overusage with dangerous results on the mankind and its environment. 
The reaction towards this warning is what differs between the two movements, each 
of which has a separate theory for what should be done in order to avoid the “end of 
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the world as we know it”, as the well-known REM song notes. Whereas the traditional 
concept of sustainability considers dematerialization and efficiency improvements as 
the best way to reduce the environmental impact and problems, degrowth focuses on 
the transformation of the system underneath that has caused the global warming and 
the source depletion (Martinez-Alier, 2009). 
 
Figure 15. Sustainable development and degrowth (García, 2004). 
In general terms the proposal of degrowth differs from any proposal that 
supports the continuing of growth as a model for society no matter if that’s called 
sustainable growth, green growth, smart growth, inclusive growth etc. Rejecting the 
system that lies under the growth policy, degrowth followers consider all the above 
proposals as policies of a common endless growth path or, as Jackson  puts it, "a 
general call to revive consumption and boost growth" that leads willy-nilly to energy 
resource depletion and rest environmental problems (Jackson, 2009). According to 
Gorz the compromise of economic development and environmental sustainability is 
impossible, since the problem is structural and systemic (Fournier, 2008; Gorz, 1993). 
It looks as if similar policies such as green-smart-inclusive growth, change the words 
because they cannot change things (Koukoulas, 2013). The question however is not to 
replace a bad economy with a good one, or bad growth with good growth, green, 
social, fair, accompanied by a robust set of regulations, but to put the imaginary 
foundations of economy into a radical challenge in order to abandon growth expansion 
(Latouche, 2010). 
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CHAPTER 4: IS DEGROWTH A WAY OUT FOR THE FUTURE? 
4.1. Degrowth: Consequence of a catastrophe or Choice of being different? 
Since the 2008 world crisis a GDP degrowth and a CO2 emissions reduction has been 
noticed (Martinez-Alier, 2009). Many considered this recession as an opportunity for 
political changes in order for this inevitable degrowth to become socially sustainable 
and this way to defend the suggestions of the degrowth proposal. However, although 
the nowadays enforced economic downscaling of production and consumption may be 
turned into an opportunity to apply the suggestions of the degrowth proposal, 
sustainable degrowth is not equivalent to negative GDP growth in a growth economy, 
distinguish between an unplanned degrowth process of the economy in a growth 
regime, and sustainable degrowth, in terms of a voluntary, smooth and equitable 
transition to lower level of production and consumption (Schneider et al., 2010). 
Economic degrowth in a growth-based economy is a not socially sustainable 
degrowth progress, as it brings unemployment, economic insecurity, lack of credit, 
inflation and finally collapse of social peace with, although it may reduce the 
environmental impact while it lasts (Schneider et al., 2010). However the proposal of 
sustainable degrowth is based on a free-willing democratic procedure that aims to 
move the scope of state governance beyond the mere increase of GDP to people’s 
wellbeing and to environmental sustainability. Thus it seems that the so called 
dilemma of degrowth does not exist, since the proposal of sustainable degrowth does 
not aim to an enforced recession but shows the way how to get out of it not only 
unwounded but with precious environmental and social benefits.   
 
4.2. A Comparison of Growth, A-Growth, and Degrowth 
I believe that growth and degrowth have already been analyzed in detail in the above 
chapters, so in this chapter I will refer to a-growth and its suggestions in order to reach 
the environmental goals necessary.  
The proposal of a-growth suggests that we remain agnostic and “indifferent 
about GDP growth” (Bergh, van den, 2011), applying caps and trades on CO2 emissions 
and rest environmental externalities setting the prices of goods at a right basis and 
continuing the important negotiations for climate change. This way the consumers will 
shift their choices from dirty to clean activities, a procedure that van den Bergh calls 
“economic restructuring”. As a reason it is provided that the relationship between 
pollution, GDP and wellbeing is difficult and complex to foresee and make definite 
statements. 
Table 6 compares degrowth with growth and a-growth. The a-growth proposal is 
indifferent to the economy perspective (once good environmental and social policies 
are pursued), considering the decrease of growth as certain, at least for a while, once 
stringent environmental and climate policies are pursued, given the fact that growth is 
based mainly on dirty rather than clean activities (Jackson and Victor, 2011).  
The degrowth proposal aims to the economy downscaling in order not only to 
meet the environmental goals but also to make the society better as a whole, 
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considering that there is a high correlation between growth, pollution/resource use 
and welfare. This fact however seems to be reconfirmed by the environmental Kuznets 
curves over the decoupling of GDP and environmental pressure which show that 
decoupling does not apply to every sector but only to relatively easy problems that 
mainly refer to human health (Stern, 2006). Jackson comes to the same conclusion that 
“the numbers do not add up” referring to the continuation of the economy growth and 
the solution of the environmental issue, unless a complete 100% decarbonization is 
succeeded (Jackson, 2009).   
 
Table 6: Comparison of Growth – A growth – Degrowth (van den Bergh and Kallis, 2012).  
Statement supported Growth A-growth Degrowth 
GDP is an accurate indicator of social welfare 
or happiness 
Yes No No 
GDP growth is necessary and sufficient for 
full employment 
Yes No No 
Growth of income increases welfare Yes Not always No 
Growth does not harm, or even promotes, 
equity and environmental sustainability 
Yes Not always No 
The aim of unconditional GDP growth 
constrains our search for improvements in 
social welfare 
No Yes Yes 
Further average income growth does not 
increase social welfare in rich countries 
No Yes Yes 
Microeconomic and macroeconomic theories 
do not give any support to GDP growth as a 
welfare- increasing strategy 
No 
attention 
Yes 
No 
Attention 
The GDP growth paradigm can be seen as an 
invention of mainly empirical 
macroeconomists and politicians 
No Yes 
No 
Attention 
The past shows a high positive correlation 
between income and environmental pressure 
No Yes Yes 
Growth is bad for the environment No Not always Yes 
Degrowth is a focused strategy to fight 
inequity and unsustainability 
No No Yes 
Growth is generated mostly by relatively 
dirty activities using much energy and 
material resources and creating much 
pollution 
No Yes Yes 
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Stringent environmental policies can 
decouple income from environmental 
pressure, and thus allow for a continuation of 
the old growth pattern 
Yes 
Possible but 
unlikely 
No 
 
The above table shows schematically that both -radical for a growth based system- 
proposals of a-growth and degrowth converge to the abandonment of the pursuit of 
growth, while promoting similar policies beneficial for the society and the environment 
such as pollution caps. They differ however in that degrowth aims to the downscaling 
of production and consumption, since this is necessary for the acceptance of stringent 
environmental policies (Kallis, 2011) for environmental sustainability to be gained, 
whereas a-growth remains indifferent to production and consumption levels as long as 
beneficial environmental policies are pursued.   
 
4.3. Steady State Economy and the superiority of Degrowth 
The steady-state economy is another alternative proposal for the reduction of the 
environmental impact first developed by Daly calling it a “zero-growth” economy 
(Kerschner, 2010). It focuses only on material thoughput (Daly, 1996) and economic 
reforms, such as cap and trade, leaving out of scope any socio-political and cultural 
changes (Kallis, 2011; Schneider et al., 2010). Herman Daly already since the 1970s was 
against the economic growth suggesting a steady state economy (Schneider et al., 
2010). According to Christian Kerschner the concepts of Degrowth and Steady State 
economy are not in contradiction but complement each other in a way that an 
economic degrowth of the North leaves space for the growth of the South providing a 
worldwide equitable steady state economy (Daly, 1996; Kerschner, 2010; Max-Neef, 
1995),  
So it seems that a common characteristic of the two proposals of a-growth and 
of steady state is that they lack in socio-political suggestions towards a multifaced 
sustainable world in general, missing out to refer to the people ‘s attitude of the 
society apart from the environment and GDP. This is actually where the main criticism 
towards these two movements is placed according to François Schneider et al., 2010, 
whereas the sustainable degrowth proposals include apart from economic and 
environmental suggestions also cultural and socio-political ones, making it a more 
complete alternative path towards the solution of the energy and environmental 
problem (Schneider et al., 2010).  
Apparently that the different backgrounds and education fields of the degrowth 
supporters have turned this movement into much more than another radical 
alternative proposal for the sustainability of the earth. Degrowth academics and 
practitioners have turned this movement into a belief on how to redefine welfare and 
“the joy of living”, as Georgescu-Roegen calls it. The solution of the environmental and 
energy problem will afterwards be solved as a mere consequence of this attitude 
change.  According to the author of this thesis this is the main reason the proposal of 
degrowth is of a higher level than a-growth or steady state economy.  
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4.4 The feasibility of Degrowth as a possible energy solution. A personal reflection 
Since degrowth aspires not only to solve the world’s energy problem together with the 
conservation of the planet, but also to bring peace in our hearts training people to act 
harmonically as a group for the common sake, one may ask himself why it is not 
implemented yet. It’s been already over 10 years since the degrowth project has been 
officially introduced from the academic society, but still there has been no progress 
putting its imperatives into practice. Is it just another firework of energy economics 
addressing merely to academics for theoretical personal reflections and endless 
discussions among the scientific cycles or can it really be implemented in the society of 
today and help us save ourselves from the disasters that’s about to take place?  
Obviously there is no doubt anymore even for the non-educated that the 
environmental impact has long exceeded the sustainable level; the rising of the sea 
levels and extreme weather conditions due to human imposed global warming are 
everyday now on the news all over the world. Technology and cleaner energy 
resources are apparently not enough to stop this or not safe. So why are we 
handicapped in a situation that leads us right to the cliff? Why can’t we just follow the 
advice of scientists for changing this growth lifestyle and turn to simplicity and pure joy 
of life? 
The addressee of these questions is mainly the political system which decides 
over the macro policies to be implemented and the market’s economy. Afterwards 
comes along the individual choice, together with its weaknesses for radical social 
change at a micro level. Luckily or not we are living in a growth-based society where 
capitalism and consumerism are promoted as the ultimate source of “good” and 
power, having infiltrated not only to institutions but also to human relationships. 
However even from the times of Aristotle material security was not the means to 
approach “eudaimonia” (well-being or prosperity). The human nature feels “at home” 
when having the potential to participate meaningfully to the life of the society, when 
being healthy and giving and receiving love, and finally feeling happy. (Aristotle’s 
Nicomachean Ethics). As a matter of fact there is an approach that the factors that lead 
to prosperity are no different than the ones which ensure subjective wellbeing and 
happiness (Dolan et al., 2008, 2006; Jackson and Papathanasopoulou, 2008; Layard, 
2005) (Figure 16).  
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Figure 16: Factors influencing subjective well-being (happiness) 
Source: GfK NOP, October 2005 (From a poll undertaken for the BBC by GfK NOP during October 2005. Results 
available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/nol/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/29_03_06_happiness_ gfkpoll.pdf). 
 
Nevertheless “the growth imperative has shaped the architecture of the modern 
economy” (Jackson, 2009). Castoriadis mentions that “the social imaginary of growth 
plays in capitalist societies the role that religion played in pre-capitalist ones” 
(Castoriadis, 1985). The pursuit of personal profit counted in monetary units has 
entered deep inside to the point that it is easier to think about the end of the world 
than a serious social change. The possession of material goods has become a life’s goal 
being connected with social and psychological meanings. Consumer goods symbolize 
nowadays one’s identity, friendship, family, sense of belonging to a community; last 
but not least they define one’s social status being under constant comparison 
(Baudrillard, 1970).  Thus, the struggle for their possession, no matter how anxious 
may be, is of major importance in today’s growth society which aims to liquidity and 
individual pursuit of consumption in order to survive via its policies and institutions. 
What is even more worrying than the above described situation is that it seems there 
is no way out of this vicious cycle if social progress continues to depend on materialism 
putting prosperity under threat.  
Of course a high income is very important up to the point that basic entitlements 
are covered, such as for example life expectancy and health. After this point however 
it seems that a rising income has not much to offer to such needs, but rather reduces 
the levels of subjective well-being and inner comfort (Jackson, 2009). See for example 
Figure 17, according to which as GDP per capita grows beyond $15,000 or so, life 
expectancy does not follow accordingly, but rather fluctuates depending on other 
factors. 
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Note: PPP = purchasing power parity. 
Source: Data are taken from statistics compiled for the Human Development Report, available online at the UNDP website: 
http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/ 
Figure 17: Life expectancy at birth v. average annual income 
 
 
Nonetheless as long as economic stability depends on growth, the pursuit of 
wealth will continue to prevail, having become part of man’s nature, which only 
teenagers and romantics still set under question. However if man would stop dreaming 
of the desired destination, he wouldn’t know which direction to follow even when the 
road seems endless, not to mention that eventually the road would be lost and hard to 
find. From a personal point of view, this is one of the main attributions degrowth has 
to offer to the society. That keeps the flame on in case needed.  
What is more, going into a sustainable degrowth process that brings prosperity 
back into the game in the critical era we live in is not a case out of the game, either via 
revolution or via social transformation. According to F. Schneider “crises open 
opportunities for alternative discourses” (Schneider et al., 2010). Mike Davis refers to 
the example of the U. S. economy which changed in a flash when needed in the 1970s 
to fight fascism: cars were shared, people used bicycles, recycled at an unprecedented 
level, hitchhiking became very popular. As he explains, the system changed so radically 
that people would not even dare to talk about their wealth publicly. To go further, 
climate change and energy resource depletion are indeed two of the century’s most 
threatening problems, which solution fulfils the preconditions for a revolutionary 
social change (Davis, 2007).   
All in all, no matter how radical the alternative proposal of Degrowth may still 
seem today to most of us, the implementation of it in the near future is not out of the 
question because on one hand of the criticalness of the two main threats of this 
century, energy resources depletion and climate change, which are due to human 
exploitation and pursuit of constant growth, and on the other hand because of the 
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man’s oppressed lust, hidden deep inside, to find back prosperity and joy of life 
released from the tyranny of a constantly demanding economy. 
 
 
Conclusions 
It is now common ground that global warming is rising at dangerous levels for life 
itself. Crude oil is sooner or later running out, not to mention the danger of nuclear 
proliferation and the insufficiency of renewables to set the situation under control. 
Moreover the rise of the world’s population makes sustainability even more difficult to 
achieve. The growth of the economy has been closely related to the pollution to the 
point that it leads to a dead-end.  
The proposal of degrowth may have been recently introduced to the scientific 
community in 2008, but the term is already known as “décroissance” since the 1970s. 
Degrowth is a "voluntary transition towards a just, participatory, and ecologically 
sustainable society” aiming to “meet basic human needs and to ensure a high quality 
of life, while reducing the ecological impact of the global economy to a sustainable 
level, equitably distributed between nations” by achieving a “right-sizing” of national 
and global economy in order to eradicate absolute poverty and ensure equity, 
democracy and prosperity that is irrelevant from the economy growth. Sustainable 
degrowth differs from forced economic degrowth that takes place in case of a crisis 
leading to recession, stagnation and social turbulence. Its proposals refer to the macro 
and micro level of the economy focusing on institutional and policy reforms (eg 
reduction of working hours, work sharing, ensuring of basic income to everyone, re-
localization of economy with local currencies and banks, introduction of simpler 
technology, regulation of advertising, slow-mode transportation, distributive taxes) 
and on alternative way of living (shared mobility and cohousing). 
Compared to other proposals degrowth has proved to be of a higher level since it 
has turned into much more than another alternative proposal for sustainability, but 
rather a belief on how to redefine welfare and prosperity that allows for an 
environmental impact reduction aiming to change the system of non-sustainable 
growth and wealth from beneath. The proposal of sustainable development, which 
addresses to a society based on the continuance of growth, still exhausts natural 
resources not improving quality of life, not to mention its non-specific meaning. A-
growth proposal, although quite alternative as well, suggests to be indifferent about 
GDP, referring merely to environmental policies, leaving out of scope socio-political 
institutions and people’s way of living. Steady State Economy, an alternative project as 
well, focuses only on material thoughput and economic reforms, not including any 
proposal for socio-political and cultural changes. 
Last but not least, sustainable degrowth is a quite alternative multifaced project 
with aspirations for a better, rather idealistic, world that’s difficult to achieve. However 
the critical era we live in today, that’s characterized by economic crisis, energy 
resource depletion and climate change, does fulfil the preconditions for the 
implementation of a new and totally different policy such as degrowth, since the 
current system has obviously failed to ensure the world’s sustainability at both 
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environmental and socio-political levels, and most importantly to bring back to the 
people the feeling of inner fulfilment and prosperity.  
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